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ABSTRACT 
 A little more than a year after the U.S. Supreme Court’s decision in 
Kelo v. City of New London upheld the use of eminent domain for 
economic development, the Ohio Supreme Court became the first 
state supreme court to address a factual situation raising the same 
issues. In City of Norwood v. Horney, the Ohio court repudiated the 
Kelo rationale and rejected Norwood’s proposed takings. Property 
rights advocates quickly hailed Norwood as a model for other state 
courts to follow in defending individual land owners from eminent 
domain abuse. This Note argues that Norwood’s holding is incoherent 
and does nothing to resolve the language-based quagmire that 
inflames the eminent domain debate. This Note instead contends that 
the Connecticut Supreme Court’s more nuanced Kelo v. City of New 
London opinion is a superior state court model, which better captures 
the necessary balance between individual property rights and urban 
revitalization plans involving eminent domain. 
INTRODUCTION 
Imagine a city official looking out at a once-thriving municipality. 
Like that official, the residents have stuck by the city from its heyday 
through its struggles and still call it home. The population has 
decreased, jobs are in dwindling supply, and industrial areas lie 
abandoned as new economies elsewhere replace the old. The city 
official grapples with the complexity of the situation: the official 
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empathizes with the property rights of the residents and the 
sentimental value they place on their homes, but the desperate need 
for and practical reality of urban revitalization are forcing the town’s 
leaders to consider taking those homes away. Complicating matters 
even further, although the United States Supreme Court appeared to 
permit the use of eminent domain for urban renewal in Kelo v. City of 
New London,1 the Ohio Supreme Court—the first state supreme 
court to confront a factual scenario raising the same issues—blatantly 
declined to follow the Kelo rationale.2 Moreover, it failed to 
announce a clear alternative to use in the state context.3 In July 2006, 
the Ohio Supreme Court decided City of Norwood v. Horney,4 
striking down Norwood’s proposed condemnation of the appellants’ 
property. 
Norwood was decided in the middle of the “firestorm of 
controversy”5 that followed Kelo. To onlookers, the Kelo decision 
interpreted the Public Use Clause of the Fifth Amendment6 to permit 
takings that transferred property to private owners for the purpose of 
economic development.7 Citizens from across the political spectrum 
decried the invasion on individual property rights and the sanctity of 
the home.8 Responses ranged from a grassroots effort to condemn 
Justice David Souter’s home in New Hampshire9 to proposed federal 
legislation that would have limited the uses of eminent domain.10 
 
 1. Kelo v. City of New London, 125 S. Ct. 2655 (2005). 
 2. See City of Norwood v. Horney, 853 N.E.2d 1115, 1142 (Ohio 2006) (“[A]n economic or 
financial benefit alone is insufficient to satisfy the public-use requirement . . . .”). 
 3. See infra Parts I.B, II. 
 4. City of Norwood v. Horney, 853 N.E.2d 1115 (Ohio 2006). 
 5. Restricting Eminent Domain, CHATTANOOGA TIMES FREE PRESS, May 26, 2006, at B6. 
 6. U.S. CONST. amend. V (“[N]or shall private property be taken for public use, without 
just compensation.”). 
 7. See, e.g., Marie Price, Eminent Domain Petition is Filed, TULSA WORLD, Dec. 21, 2005, 
at A11 (“In [Kelo], the [C]ourt said the U.S. Constitution allows the government to condemn 
property for private development purposes if the result would increase jobs or tax revenue.”). 
 8. See Judy Coleman, The Powers of a Few, the Anger of the Many, WASH. POST, Oct. 9, 
2005, at B2 (“[T]he result was a firestorm of public resentment that cut across party and 
ideological lines.”). 
 9. See id. (noting that a resident of California filed a petition to condemn Justice Souter’s 
New Hampshire home because Justice Souter had voted with the majority). 
 10. See Protection of Homes, Small Businesses, and Private Property Act of 2005, S. 1313, 
109th Cong. (2005) (attempting to require that “‘public use’ . . . not be construed to include 
economic development”); see also Sonya D. Jones, Note and Comment, That Land Is Your 
Land, This Land Is My Land . . . Until the Local Government Can Turn It for a Profit: A Critical 
Analysis of Kelo v. City of New London, 20 BYU J. PUB. L. 139, 161 (2005) (“Within five days 
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flurry of legislative action, the spotlight has also expanded to include 
the state courts, which interpret the existing and newly enacted 
eminent domain statutes.15 It is unclear whether the judiciary will 
offer solace to property rights advocates as legislatures did given that, 
after all, it was a court, albeit the U.S. Supreme Court, that construed 
“public use” so broadly.16 After Norwood, the question of what role 
the state courts should play in the takings debate demands even more 
attention. Property rights advocates have argued that future state 
courts considering economic development issues should use Norwood 
as a model for deciding those cases.17 
This Note evaluates Norwood as such a potential model. Part I 
provides the factual background and legal findings of Kelo v. City of 
New London and City of Norwood v. Horney. Part II examines more 
closely the Ohio Supreme Court’s holding in Norwood and clarifies 
that decision. Part III goes on to explain how the transmutation of 
language in the eminent domain debate has muddied the usefulness 
of Norwood as a model decision. Part IV proposes that revisiting a 
different state court opinion—the Connecticut Supreme Court’s 
opinion in Kelo v. City of New London18—offers a better framework 
than Norwood does for state courts deciding the legality of takings in 
economic development proposals. This Note warns that despite its 
first-in-time position among Kelo’s progeny, the Ohio Supreme 
Court’s Norwood decision should not be used as a model and that the 
Connecticut Supreme Court in Kelo suggested a superior approach. 
 
 15. Justice Stevens anticipated that state courts would play a key role in the future of 
eminent domain when he referred to both state constitutional law and state statutes. See Kelo, 
125 S. Ct. at 2668 (noting that states’ public use restrictions “have been established as a matter 
of state constitutional law” and by limiting language within state statutes). 
 16. “Public use” is typically judged to have two competing definitions. The “broad” 
definition of “public use” equates it with “public advantage.” Kelo v. City of New London, 843 
A.2d 500, 531 n.41 (Conn. 2004), aff’d, 125 S. Ct. 2655 (2005). The “narrow” definition means 
that “the property acquired by eminent domain must actually be used by the public or that the 
public must have the opportunity to use the property taken.” Id. (quoting 2A P. NICHOLS, 
EMINENT DOMAIN § 7.02[2]–[7] (J. Sackman ed., rev. 3d ed. 2003)). 
 17. See, e.g., Lee, supra note 11, at 139–40 (praising Norwood and calling for states to 
“resurrect . . . the constitutional protections tossed out by the [U.S.] Supreme Court”). 
 18. Kelo v. City of New London, 843 A.2d 500 (Conn. 2004), aff’d, 125 S. Ct. 2655 (2005). 
04__HAN.DOC 5/27/2008 1:48:31 PM 
2008] EMINENT DOMAIN 1453 
I.  KELO V. CITY OF NEW LONDON  
AND CITY OF NORWOOD V. HORNEY 
It is impossible to proceed in any eminent domain discussion 
without mentioning Kelo. To that end, this Part first highlights the 
necessary facts from Kelo and briefly summarizes the U.S. Supreme 
Court’s legal analysis. It then goes on to describe Norwood. It 
explains how the Ohio Supreme Court invoked three major court 
opinions to address the status of takings law in Ohio, but ultimately 
disposed of the case at hand using the void-for-vagueness doctrine. 
A. Kelo v. City of New London 
New London is a city on the eastern coast of Connecticut where 
the Thames River empties into the Long Island Sound.19 The Fort 
Trumbull area of New London is a peninsula that juts out eastward 
into the Thames.20 In 1990, a state agency designated New London as 
a “distressed municipality.”21 Employment rates were declining, and 
specifically, in 1996, the United States Naval Undersea Warfare 
Center on Fort Trumbull closed, leading to “more than 1000 
positions” being transferred sixty miles east to Newport, Rhode 
Island.22 In 1998, the unemployment rate of New London “was nearly 
double that of [Connecticut], and its population of just under 24,000 
residents was at its lowest since 1920.”23 
 
 19. Kelo, 125 S. Ct. at 2658. 
 20. Id. at 2659. 
 21. Id. at 2658. “Distressed municipality” is defined in the Connecticut Statutes. CONN. 
GEN. STAT. ANN. § 32-9p (West 2003). There are several ways that a city can be designated a 
“distressed municipality,” but generally, the city must meet certain “thresholds of distress” in 
areas such as “high unemployment and poverty, aging housing stock and low or declining rates 
of growth in job creation, population and per capita income.” Id. Those thresholds may be set at 
either the state or federal level. Id. For example, if a city met the criteria to be eligible for an 
Urban Development Action Grant, it could be designated a “distressed municipality.” Id. The 
United States Department of Housing and Urban Development issues regulations that lay out 
those criteria. The grant was part of a federal program intended to encourage municipalities to 
leverage private funds into redevelopment projects. See H.R. REP NO. 95-634, at 45 (1977) 
(Conf. Rep.), as reprinted in 1977 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2965, 2965 (clarifying that the program aimed to 
“stimulat[e] . . . private investment and community revitalization” in areas of outmigration and 
stagnation). Although the statute authorizing the program remains active, Congress has not 
appropriated funds for the program since 1988. Kary L. Moss, The Privatizing of Public Wealth, 
23 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 101, 130 n.166 (1995). 
 22. Kelo, 843 A.2d at 510. The court noted that “approximately 1900 government sector 
positions” had been lost during the years leading up to the case. Id. 
 23. Kelo, 125 S. Ct. at 2658. 
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In January 1998, the Connecticut state bond commission 
authorized bonds to support planning activities, property acquisition, 
and the ultimate creation of a state park in the Fort Trumbull area.24 
Thanks to these bonds, New London was able to begin the process of 
redevelopment. For New London, the bonds were a long-awaited 
turn to secure economic stability; for years, the city had watched 
fellow municipalities finance revival projects with state bonds.25 A 
month later, Pfizer Inc. announced that it was developing a global 
research facility adjacent to Fort Trumbull.26 Within another couple of 
months, the city council authorized the New London Development 
Corporation (NLDC), a private nonprofit corporation established to 
assist the city in planning economic development, to prepare a 
development plan for the area.27 With the assistance of RKG 
Associates, a private real estate development consulting firm,28 the 
NLDC’s final plan was a “composite of the most beneficial features” 
of no fewer than six alternative plans.29 To realize the plan, the NLDC 
managed to purchase most of the real estate in the ninety-acre Fort 
Trumbull area, but its negotiations with Susette Kelo and eight other 
owners failed.30 The NLDC voted to use the power of eminent 
domain—pursuant to chapter 132 of the Connecticut General 
Statutes31—to acquire the properties whose owners had not been 
 
 24. Kelo, 843 A.2d at 508. The state “authorized a $5.35 million bond issue to support the 
NLDC’s planning activities and a $10 million bond issue toward the creation of a Fort Trumbull 
State Park.” Kelo, 125 S. Ct. at 2659. 
 25. DVD: Distinctive Aspects of American Law, Kelo v. City of New London, 545 U.S. 469 
(2005) (Duke University School of Law 2006) (on file with the Duke Law Journal). 
 26. Kelo, 843 A.2d at 508. The research facility cost approximately $300 million to 
construct. Kelo, 125 S. Ct. at 2659. In June 2001, the Pfizer facility opened and began operations. 
Kelo, 843 A.2d at 509. 
 27. Kelo, 843 A.2d at 508. 
 28. Id. at 553. 
 29. Id. at 510. Those alternate plans included the following: 
(1) no action, with the assumption that some development activities would proceed 
under the direction of other entities, such as the United States Navy, without action 
by the development corporation; (2) recreational and cultural facilities to 
complement the adjacent state park; (3) residential construction with minor amounts 
of retail and office space; (4) a business campus supported by the hotel and 
conference center; and (5) two mixed use alternates combining residences, 
recreational, commercial, hotel and retail uses in differing arrangements. 
Id. at 510 n.6. The development plan was projected to generate between “(1) 518 and 867 
construction jobs; (2) 718 and 1362 direct jobs; and (3) 500 and 940 indirect jobs. The composite 
parcels of the development plan also [were] expected to generate between $680,544 and 
$1,249,843 in property tax revenues for the city.” Id. at 510. 
 30. Kelo, 125 S. Ct. at 2660. 
 31. CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 8-193 (West 2003). 
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willing to sell.32 In November 2000, the NLDC filed the condemnation 
proceedings.33 
The development plan concerned seven out of about 115 land 
parcels in the complete Fort Trumbull area.34 Susette Kelo and the 
other eight owners possessed property on two of those seven parcels, 
“parcel 3” and “parcel 4A.”35 Some of the properties were owner-
occupied, and the rest were held as investments.36 Susette Kelo had 
lived in her Fort Trumbull home since 1997 and especially liked it 
“for its water view.”37 Under the development plan, parcel 3 was 
“projected to have at least 90,000 square feet of high technology 
research and development office space and parking.”38 Parcel 4A was 
“designated for ‘park support’; it [would] provide parking or retail 
services for the adjacent state park.”39 In December 2000, Susette 
Kelo and the other eight owners filed suit to enjoin the takings.40 The 
New London Superior Court granted a permanent restraining order 
prohibiting the taking of the parcel 4A properties, but it allowed the 
parcel 3 takings.41 Both sides appealed, and the Connecticut Supreme 
Court reversed as to parcel 4A.42 In other words, all of New London’s 
proposed takings were permissible, according to Connecticut’s 
highest court. Susette Kelo and the other property owners took their 
case to the Supreme Court of the United States. 
In a 5–4 decision, the Supreme Court narrowly affirmed the 
Connecticut Supreme Court’s decision to uphold the takings.43 
Writing for the majority, Justice John Paul Stevens presented the 
issue as follows: “The question presented is whether the city’s 
proposed disposition of this property qualifies as a ‘public use’ within 
the meaning of the Takings Clause of the Fifth Amendment to the 
 
 32. Kelo, 843 A.2d at 510–11. 
 33. Id. at 511. 
 34. Id. at 509. The plans for each of these areas ranged from a waterfront hotel and 
conference center on parcel 1 to office, parking, and retail space on parcel 5. Id. 
 35. Kelo, 125 S. Ct. at 2660. Parcel 4 was “subdivided into two smaller parcels, 4A and 4B.” 
Kelo, 843 A.2d at 509. 
 36. Kelo, 125 S. Ct. at 2660. 
 37. Id. 
 38. Kelo, 843 A.2d at 509. 
 39. Id. The proposed Fort Trumbull State Park was planned for parcel 2. Id. 
 40. Id. at 511. 
 41. Kelo, 125 S. Ct. at 2660. 
 42. Id. 
 43. Id. at 2669. 
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Constitution.”44 On one end of a spectrum, he recognized that the 
taking of private property for the sole purpose of transferring it to 
another private owner was necessarily unconstitutional, regardless of 
any compensation.45 On the other end, he recognized that if the taking 
were for public use, then with just compensation, the taking was 
constitutional.46 The situation in Kelo, as with many such cases, fit 
somewhere in the middle. 
The Court relied on its holdings in Berman v. Parker47 and 
Hawaii Housing Authority v. Midkiff48 in laying out the broad, 
deferential stance its takings precedent had followed.49 In Berman, the 
Court upheld the taking of a nonblighted structure within a 
development area that was as a whole blighted for eventual transfer 
to private parties.50 In Midkiff, the Court upheld the transfer of taken 
land to private parties to break up an oligopoly of land ownership.51 
Based largely on these two cases, the Court held that the transfer of 
property to private ownership did not automatically invalidate the 
takings.52 Instead, it affirmed the Connecticut Supreme Court’s 
decision that the takings were constitutional.53 
 
 44. Id. at 2658. Justice Stevens’s choice of the neutral phrase “proposed disposition of this 
property” is not insignificant. At the heart of the eminent domain debate is whether the 
“proposed disposition” was “urban redevelopment” or whether it was “economic 
development.” See infra Part III.B. Of course, this semantic difference might just be a red 
herring. 
 45. Kelo, 125 S. Ct. at 2661 (“On the one hand, it has long been accepted that the sovereign 
may not take the property of A for the sole purpose of transferring it to another private party B, 
even though A is paid just compensation.”). 
 46. Id. (“On the other hand, it is equally clear that a State may transfer property from one 
private party to another if future ‘use by the public’ is the purpose of the taking . . . .”). 
 47. Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26 (1954). 
 48. Haw. Hous. Auth. v. Midkiff, 467 U.S. 229 (1984). 
 49. Kelo, 125 S. Ct. at 2663–64. 
 50. Berman, 348 U.S. at 35; accord Kelo, 125 S. Ct. at 2663. In Justice Stevens’s view, the 
key to Berman was not the taking itself, but rather the Court’s holding that the area in question 
must be looked at as a whole, which therefore justifies the public use. Kelo, 125 S. Ct. at 2665 
n.13. Justice Stevens relied on the effect, not the actual taking itself.  
 51. Midkiff, 467 U.S. at 242; accord Kelo, 125 S. Ct. at 2663–64. 
 52. Kelo, 125 S. Ct. at 2660. Justice Stevens also cites to Ruckelhaus v. Monsanto Co., 467 
U.S. 986 (1984), as a further argument against seeking a bright-line rule in takings 
jurisprudence. Kelo, 125 S. Ct. at 2663 n.10. Ruckelhaus provided an example of a transfer of 
property from private owners to other private owners, but which had a direct benefit to the 
public. Perhaps due to the fact that the property involved was not land, Ruckelhaus is typically 
not discussed when legal scholars refer to the precedents leading up to Kelo. See, e.g., Alan T. 
Ackerman, Kelo v. City of New London: The Answer to the Public Use Question or Just a 
Source of More Questions?, in CURRENT CONDEMNATION LAW: TAKINGS, COMPENSATION, 
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The decision was an ostensible blow to property rights advocates, 
but Justice Stevens stressed that the holding was a mere baseline for 
takings law. He wrote that states, through their statutes and their 
constitutions, could afford greater protection for their citizens from 
eminent domain actions: 
We emphasize that nothing in our opinion precludes any State from 
placing further restrictions on its exercise of the takings power. 
Indeed, many States already impose “public use” requirements that 
are stricter than the federal baseline. Some of these requirements 
have been established as a matter of state constitutional law, while 
others are expressed in state eminent domain statutes that carefully 
limit the grounds upon which takings may be exercised.54 
This limitation in Kelo amounted to a virtual permission slip for state 
courts to circumvent the decision.55 Whether this was Justice Stevens’s 
intention or not, Justice Sandra Day O’Connor bluntly criticized this 
portion of the majority’s opinion as “an abdication of [the Supreme 
Court’s] responsibility.”56 Unsurprisingly, Kelo’s critics have seized 
upon this language from Justice Stevens’s opinion and turned the 
Supreme Court’s permission into a political mandate. 
B. City of Norwood v. Horney 
City of Norwood v. Horney was the first major state supreme 
court case to provide an opportunity to apply the Kelo ruling directly 
to a set of analogous facts.57 The Ohio court made a point of 
 
AND BENEFITS 293, 299–301 (Alan T. Ackerman & Darius W. Dynkowski eds., 2d ed. 2006) 
(discussing only Berman and Midkiff together). 
 53. Kelo, 125 S. Ct. at 2669. 
 54. Id. at 2668. The majority cited Michigan’s County of Wayne v. Hathcock, 684 N.W.2d 
765 (Mich. 2004), as an example of state constitutional law acting as a more stringent limit on 
eminent domain than the federal constitution. Kelo, 125 S. Ct. at 2668 n.22. 
 55. Cf. id. at 2677 (O’Connor, J., dissenting) (“Today nearly all real property is susceptible 
to condemnation on the Court’s theory.”). 
 56. Id. Justice O’Connor also pointed out the irony of asking states to “compensat[e] for 
[the Supreme Court’s] refusal to enforce properly . . . a provision meant to curtail state action.” 
Id. 
 57. Between the Kelo decision in June 2005 and the Norwood decision in July 2006, the 
highest courts of seven states cited the Supreme Court’s Kelo decision but did not directly 
address its legal holding. See Kellogg v. Dearborn Info. Servs., 119 P.3d 20, 24 (Mont. 2005) 
(Rice, J., dissenting) (employing a quote by James Madison from Justice O’Connor’s dissent 
stating that a “just government” should secure to each citizen “whatever is his own”); Nevadans 
for the Prot. of Prop. Rights, Inc. v. Heller, 141 P.3d 1235, 1243–44 (Nev. 2006) (noting that a 
voter initiative seeking to restrict eminent domain was responding to the Kelo decision); id. at 
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recognizing that its decision fit within a much broader debate,58 and 
referenced the section of the holding in Kelo stating that state courts 
and legislatures could restrict takings pursuant to state law and 
constitutions.59 
The appellants in Norwood were two couples, Carl and Joy 
Gamble and Joseph P. Horney and his wife, Carol Gooch.60 The 
Gambles had lived in their neighborhood in the city of Norwood for 
more than thirty-five years.61 Horney and his wife had previously lived 
in Norwood, and the couple owned and operated rental properties in 
the area at the time of the takings.62 
Norwood itself is surrounded by the city of Cincinnati.63 It once 
was “home to several manufacturing plants and businesses that 
provided a substantial tax base.”64 Since the late 1960’s, however, it 
had economically and physically declined.65 Prior to the suit, 
 
1251–52 (Maupin, J. dissenting) (the same); McCarran Int’l Airport v. Sisolak, 137 P.3d 1110, 
1126 (Nev. 2006) (citing Kelo in support of a holding that states may interpret their own 
constitutions as restricting their taking powers more than the federal constitution does); In re 
Initiative Petition No. 382, 142 P.3d 400, 408 (Okla. 2006) (noting that Kelo “has prompted a 
national discussion on the proper limitations on the power of eminent domain”); Conti v. R.I. 
Econ. Dev. Corp., 900 A.2d 1221, 1231 (R.I. 2006) (citing Kelo in support of the proposition that 
the Just Compensation Clause of the federal constitution applies to the states via the Fourteenth 
Amendment); R.I. Econ. Dev. Corp. v. Parking Co., 892 A.2d 87, 104 (R.I. 2006) (citing Kelo 
for the proposition that a condemnation must be done in good faith and that a comprehensive 
plan is indicative of the public use of the takings); Benson v. State, 710 N.W.2d 131, 146 (S.D. 
2006) (holding that despite the federal constitution’s allowance of takings that get conveyed to 
private owners, Kelo allows states to construe their own constitutions more narrowly, which 
South Dakota does); Hoffman Family, L.L.C. v. City of Alexandria, 634 S.E.2d 722, 731 (Va. 
2006) (noting the inapplicability of Kelo to a condemnation for a public utility to be run by the 
city and that Kelo’s holding only applies to the federal constitution); Norfolk Redevelopment & 
Hous. Auth. v. C & C Real Estate, Inc., 630 S.E.2d 505, 509 (Va. 2006) (citing Kelo as 
paralleling the takings clause of the Virginia Constitution); HTK Mgmt., L.L.C. v. Seattle 
Popular Monorail Auth., 121 P.3d 1166, 1168 (Wash. 2005) (distinguishing Kelo because the 
condemnation was for a monorail—a clear public use); id. at 639 (Johnson, J., dissenting) (citing 
Kelo because states are permitted to restrict the takings power); see also Bd. of County 
Comm’rs v. Lowery, 136 P.3d 639, 650 (Okla. 2006) (explaining a holding that was inconsistent 
with Kelo based on Justice Stevens’s permitting states to interpret state laws more strictly). 
 58. See City of Norwood v. Horney, 853 N.E.2d 1115, 1122 (Ohio 2006) (“Our 
consideration does not take place in a vacuum.”). 
 59. Id. 
 60. Id. at 1124 n.3. 
 61. Id. 
 62. Id. 
 63. Id. at 1123. 
 64. Id. 
 65. See id. at 1124 (describing the construction of Interstate 71 and the concomitant and 
subsequent replacement of residences with businesses). 
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Rookwood Partners Ltd., a private company, began discussions with 
Norwood about redeveloping the appellants’ neighborhood.66 The 
plans envisioned “more than 200 apartments or condominiums and 
over 500,000 square feet of office and retail space . . . as well as two 
large public-parking facilities . . . with spaces for more than 2,000 
vehicles.”67 The expected increase in city revenue from the proposed 
project was approximately $2 million annually.68 The City of Norwood 
was especially interested in the proposed project because it was 
operating with a deficit and therefore unable to finance 
redevelopment on its own.69 Rookwood initially asked that Norwood 
use its power of eminent domain to prepare the properties, but 
Norwood insisted that Rookwood first attempt to negotiate the 
purchase of the property directly with the current owners.70 
Rookwood successfully acquired most of the needed properties via 
voluntary purchase but not those owned by the appellants.71 
To use its power of eminent domain, Norwood was obligated to 
commission an urban renewal study of the prospective development 
area.72 The Kinzelman Kline Grossman consulting firm (KKG) 
prepared the study and concluded that “the neighborhood was a 
‘deteriorating area’ as that term is defined in the [City of Norwood 
Codified Ordinances (Norwood Code)].”73 The city council adopted 
 
 66. Id. Significantly, in Norwood the private developer approached the municipality 
whereas in Kelo the state bond provided the impetus for the municipality to approach the 
private developer. See supra text accompanying notes 24–26. 
 67. Norwood, 853 N.E.2d at 1124. The residential and retail spaces would have been owned 
by Rookwood, and the parking facilities would have been owned by Norwood. Id. 
 68. Id. 
 69. Compare id. (suggesting that the financial impetus for the redevelopment in Norwood 
was a private company), with Kelo v. City of New London, 843 A.2d 500, 508 (Conn. 2004) 
(noting that the financial impetus for the redevelopment in New London was a state bond), 
aff’d, 125 S. Ct. 2655 (2005). 
 70. Norwood, 853 N.E.2d at 1124. 
 71. Id. at 1125. Many of the residents in the neighborhood were happy to sell and ended up 
enjoying lucrative compensation. See generally Steven Kemme & Gregory Korte, Editorial, 
Untold Story, CIN. ENQUIRER, Apr. 30, 2006, at 1E (providing details on how “most of 
the . . . property owners were handsomely compensated” and describing the legal battles of the 
six holdouts). 
 72. Norwood, 853 N.E.2d at 1125 n.4 (citing NORWOOD, OHIO, CODIFIED ORDINANCES  
§§ 163.03 to 163.09, which required a “study of an area in order to determine whether 
redevelopment [was] needed”). 
 73. Id. at 1125. The Norwood Code distinguished between a “deteriorated area” and a 
“deteriorating area.” Id. at n.5. According to CODIFIED ORDINANCES § 163.02(b), a 
“deteriorated area” was the equivalent of a slum or blighted area. Id. In contrast, according to 
CODIFIED ORDINANCES § 163.02(c), a “deteriorating area” was 
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the development plan and proceeded to file complaints to 
appropriate the appellants’ properties.74 After a trial that lasted 
several days, the trial court unearthed inconsistencies in KKG’s study, 
including the firm’s conflation of the Norwood Code sections that 
defined a “deteriorating area” and a “deteriorated area.”75 
Nevertheless, the court addressed both standards and concluded that 
Norwood had abused its discretion in concluding that the 
neighborhood was a “deteriorated area.”76 The court, however, found 
no such abuse of discretion in Norwood’s characterizing the 
neighborhood as a “deteriorating area” and allowed the 
condemnations to proceed.77 The property owners lost their appeal 
and took their cases to the Ohio Supreme Court.78 
The supreme court began its discussion of the relevant 
constitutional considerations by addressing legal scholarship 
espousing the special place private property rights enjoyed within 
“our theory of democracy and notions of liberty.”79 The court 
declared that “Ohio has always considered the right of property to be 
a fundamental right.”80 Then the court turned its attention and 
recognized the “political necessity” of the power of eminent domain.81 
It noted that like the federal constitution, Ohio’s constitution 
balanced these interests by conditioning eminent domain on the 
equitable condition of public use.82 In setting up the historical 
development of the public use doctrine in Ohio—and possibly 
 
an area, whether predominantly built up or open, which is not a slum, blighted or 
deteriorated area but which . . . is detrimental to the public health, safety, morals and 
general welfare, and which will deteriorate, or is in danger of deteriorating, into a 
blighted area. 
Id. (citing CODIFIED ORDINANCES § 163.02(c)). 
 74. Id. at 1125–26. 
 75. Id. at 1126. 
 76. Id. (emphasis added). 
 77. Id. at 1126–27 (emphasis added). 
 78. Id. at 1127. 
 79. Id. at 1128 (citing as an example ROBERT MELTZ, DWIGHT H. MERRIAM & RICHARD 
M. FRANK, THE TAKINGS ISSUE: CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITS ON LAND USE CONTROL AND 
ENVIRONMENTAL REGULATION 10 (1999)). 
 80. Id. at 1129; see also OHIO CONST. art. I, § 1 (“All men . . . have certain inalienable 
rights, among which are those of . . . acquiring, possessing, and protecting property.”); OHIO 
CONST. art. I, § 19 (“Private property shall ever be held inviolate, but subservient to the public 
welfare . . . .”). 
 81. Norwood, 853 N.E.2d at 1129. 
 82. Id. at 1130; see also OHIO CONST. art. I, § 19 (“[I]n all other cases, where private 
property shall be taken for public use, a compensation therefor shall first be made . . . .”). 
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foreshadowing its ultimate holding—the court noted the difficulty of 
answering whether the public use condition was satisfied and referred 
to Justice O’Connor’s Kelo dissent for the simple proposition that this 
was a “difficult question.”83 It then carefully traced the legal 
authorities that had dealt with the public use doctrine since the 
founding of the United States.84 The discussion eventually converged 
on the same federal cases that appear regularly in the public use 
debate and on which Kelo heavily relied: Berman and Midkiff.85 From 
that nexus, the Ohio court framed the issue as follows: “In some 
jurisdictions, a belief has taken hold that general economic 
development is a public use. . . . Kelo confirmed this view for 
purposes of federal constitutional analysis despite the fact that many 
legal commentators have expressed alarm at the potential abuse of 
the eminent-domain power in such circumstances.”86 The court 
unsurprisingly held: 
In addressing the meaning of the public-use clause in Ohio’s 
Constitution, we are not bound to follow the United States Supreme 
Court’s determinations of the scope of the Public-Use Clause in the 
federal Constitution, and we decline to hold that the Takings Clause 
in Ohio’s Constitution has the sweeping breadth that the Supreme 
Court attributed to the United States Constitution’s Takings Clause 
in Midkiff . . . .87 
The Ohio Supreme Court then looked at the role of the judiciary 
in the inquiry. It held that although some deference is due to 
legislative determinations of public use, the separation of powers 
doctrine would necessarily be violated if the judiciary always 
acquiesced to the legislature’s purported invocation of the police 
power.88 The court reiterated at least four times in its opinion the 
“limited” though “critical” role the judiciary must play by interposing 
itself as a check on the legislature.89 The court’s self-admonition was 
 
 83. Norwood, 853 N.E.2d at 1130. 
 84. Id. at 1131–35. 
 85. Id. at 1135. 
 86. Id. at 1135–36 (citations omitted). 
 87. Id. at 1136 (citations omitted). 
 88. See id. at 1137 (asserting the danger in allowing the state to use police power as a 
means to “virtually immunize all takings from judicial review”). The police power was one of 
the key rationales given in Berman and Midkiff for deferring to the legislature’s determination 
of public use. Id. But see infra note 138. 
 89. See, e.g., Norwood, 853 N.E.2d at 1138 (“The scrutiny by the courts in appropriation 
cases is limited in scope, but it clearly remains a critical constitutional component.”). 
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grounded in a fear of powerful private interest groups exerting their 
influence on susceptible public agencies with eminent domain 
authority.90 This fear was articulated by both Justice O’Connor in her 
dissent91 and Justice Peter T. Zarella in his Connecticut Supreme 
Court Kelo dissent.92 
With these principles in mind, the Ohio court turned its attention 
to the public use at issue in the proposed Norwood development plan. 
In a definitive yet paradoxically noncommittal statement, the court 
chose not to distinguish the facts from Kelo but rather to reject the 
Kelo opinion altogether: 
[W]e find that the analysis by the Supreme Court of Michigan in 
[County of Wayne v.] Hathcock and those presented by the 
dissenting judges of the Supreme Court of Connecticut and the 
dissenting justices of the United States Supreme Court in Kelo are 
better models for interpreting Section 19, Article I of Ohio’s 
Constitution.93 
On this legal basis, the Ohio court ultimately held that “[a]lthough 
economic benefit can be considered as a factor among others in 
determining whether there is a sufficient public use and benefit in a 
taking, it cannot serve as the sole basis for finding such benefit.”94 
What looked like the beginning of an announcement of a test for 
public use in economic development contexts, however, went no 
further. The court instead chose to use the void-for-vagueness 
doctrine and notions of due process to attack the Norwood Code that 
authorized the takings of deteriorating areas.95 It was therefore able 
to sidestep further definition of the public use concept.96 
 
 90. Id. at 1140. The Connecticut Supreme Court was not immune to this fear either. In 
siding with New London, it thoroughly considered Pfizer’s involvement in the creation of the 
development plan. Kelo v. City of New London, 843 A.2d 500, 542 (Conn. 2004), aff’d, 125 S. 
Ct. 2655 (2005). Although Pfizer had certain “requirements” it hoped that New London would 
implement, the executive vice president of RKG Associates, which had assisted the NLDC in 
developing the development plan, was “never told that Pfizer would not come to the city if the 
hotel [which was needed] was not built.” Id. at 538. The court was ultimately satisfied that the 
takings were done in good faith. Id. at 542. 
 91. Norwood, 853 N.E.2d at 1138 (quoting Kelo v. City of New London, 125 S. Ct. 2655, 
2676–77 (2005) (O’Connor, J., dissenting)); see also infra note 167. 
 92. Norwood, 853 N.E.2d at 1140 (quoting Kelo, 843 A.2d at 579 (Zarella, J., dissenting)); 
see also infra notes 108, 116 and accompanying text.  
 93. Norwood, 853 N.E.2d at 1140. 
 94. Id. at 1141 (citations omitted). 
 95. See id. at 1142–43 (analyzing the case under the void-for-vagueness doctrine). At least 
one commentator sharply criticized the Ohio Supreme Court’s application of the void-for-
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II.  WHAT IS NORWOOD’S HOLDING? 
This Part attempts to do what the Ohio Supreme Court did not 
and articulate a cohesive holding so that the Norwood decision’s 
utility as a potential model for other state courts can be assessed. To 
interpret the public use clause of the Ohio Constitution, Norwood 
invoked three decisions: the Supreme Court Kelo dissent, the state 
Kelo dissent, and County of Wayne v. Hathcock.97 Other than stating 
that an economic benefit can be a factor for determining public use, 
but not the only one,98 the Ohio Supreme Court did not explicate how 
these decisions should be synthesized, let alone applied to the facts at 
hand. By citing the three opinions, including the Kelo dissent, 
Norwood did not merely use Justice Stevens’s Kelo majority opinion 
as a “baseline” from which to construe the Norwood city statutes; 
instead, it rejected the entirety of the Kelo analysis.99 Of course, the 
Ohio Supreme Court could not overrule the U.S. Supreme Court, but 
what it actually meant by its invocation of three distinct court 
opinions from a legal holding standpoint was not clear.100 This Part 
briefly describes those three opinions and then suggests a way to 
synthesize them into a consistent legal principle. 
 
vagueness doctrine to eminent domain statutes, finding the doctrine’s purposes inapposite to the 
property context. See generally Sarah Sparks, Comment and Casenote, Deteriorated vs. 
Deteriorating: The Void-For-Vagueness Doctrine and Blight Takings, Norwood v. Horney, 75 U. 
CIN. L. REV. 1769 (2007) (arguing against the void-for-vagueness doctrine in the eminent 
domain context and warning that such application might problematically lead to the doctrine’s 
application to the “public use” clauses in statutes). 
 96. See Norwood, 853 N.E.2d at 1146 (holding that because the void-for-vagueness 
doctrine applied, there was no “adequate showing that the takings were for a public use”). The 
case was decided unanimously. See id. at 1153 (listing the justices concurring in the judgment). 
 97. County of Wayne v. Hathcock, 684 N.W.2d 765 (Mich. 2004). 
 98. See Norwood, 853 N.E.2d at 1141 (“Although economic benefit can be considered as a 
factor among others in determining whether there is a sufficient public use and benefit in a 
taking, it cannot serve as the sole basis for finding such benefit.”); see also infra Part III.B 
(discussing the language of “economic benefit”). 
 99. See Norwood, 853 N.E.2d at 1141 (stating explicitly that the approach of the Kelo 
dissent is the preferred way to interpret Section 19, Article I of the Ohio Constitution). 
 100. There is some indication that Ohio residents themselves are not sure which side of the 
debate can best use the Norwood decision. See Gregory Korte, Owners, City Refer to Same 
Land Case, CIN. ENQUIRER, Dec. 8, 2006, at 2B (“Both sides in a Clifton Heights[, Ohio,] 
eminent domain dispute argued their case before a state appeals court Thursday, and both cited 
the same Norwood case as precedent.”). 
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A. Justice Zarella’s State Kelo Dissent 
Writing to dissent from the Connecticut Supreme Court’s Kelo 
decision, Justice Zarella advocated using a heightened scrutiny test to 
evaluate proposed takings101 and concluded that all of New London’s 
proposed takings were unconstitutional.102 Justice Zarella wanted to 
limit the deference the court would afford to legislative 
determinations of public use. Although he conceded that “[i]t is well 
established that judicial deference to determinations of public use by 
state legislatures is appropriate,”103 he asserted that “judicial 
deference to legislative declarations of public use does not require 
complete abdication of judicial responsibility.”104 
Justice Zarella distinguished the takings pursuant to chapter 132 
of the Connecticut General Statutes105 from previously accepted 
definitions of public use in two ways: that proper takings “almost 
always are followed by an immediate or reasonably foreseeable 
public benefit”106 and that “the public benefit derived from a 
conventional taking typically flows from the actions of the taking 
party.”107 Of particular concern was the fact that chapter 132 
contained a provision whereby 
a development plan may be abandoned within three years of its 
approval, and that any properties acquired thereunder may be 
conveyed free of the plan’s restrictions if they cannot be conveyed to 
a private party at fair market value pursuant to the plan. . . . 
Accordingly, under chapter 132 . . . the possibility that a project may 
be abandoned after properties have been taken by eminent 
domain . . . raises concerns regarding the limits of the takings power 
that cannot be ignored.108 
 
 101. Kelo v. City of New London, 843 A.2d 500, 587 (Conn. 2004) (Zarella, J., dissenting), 
aff’d, 125 S. Ct. 2655 (2005). 
 102. Id. at 600–01. 
 103. Id. at 581. 
 104. Id. at 582. 
 105. CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 8-200(b) (West 2003). 
 106. Kelo, 848 A.2d at 578 (Zarella, J., dissenting). 
 107. Id. at 579. The dissent further distinguished chapter 132 by comparing it directly to 
other Connecticut General Statutes in which the “disposition of property,” that is, the transfer 
of taken property to private ownership, was “‘incidental to’ the elimination of blight” (i.e., the 
public use). Id. 
 108. Id. at 580 (describing CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 8-200(b)). 
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The dissent pressed for a four-step heightened scrutiny test “to 
ensure that the constitutional rights of private property owners are 
protected adequately when property is taken for private economic 
development under chapter 132 of the General Statutes.”109 The 
dissent’s proposed test amounted to shifting burdens of proof.110 The 
linchpin to this test is the third step, where the burden shifts to the 
party seeking the taking. That party must show by “clear and 
convincing evidence” that the questioned development plan will in 
fact result in a public benefit.111 Although the dissent found that the 
situation satisfied step one112 and step two113 of its test, it was not so 
convinced in applying step three. It found a lack of clear and 
convincing evidence that the plan would “actually” benefit the 
public.114 The dissent summarized its problem with the development 
plan by likening it to a “‘Field of Dreams’ test”: 
[I]f the enabling statute is constitutional, if the plan of development 
is drawn in good faith and if the plan merely states that there are 
economic benefits to be realized, that is enough. . . . [T]he test is 
premised on the concept that “if you build it, [they] will come,” and 
fails to protect adequately the rights of the private property 
owners.115 
 
 109. Id. at 587. In step one, the court should examine the facial constitutionality of the 
statutory scheme, and the party opposing the taking should bear the initial burden of proving 
that the proposed public use of private economic development is unconstitutional. Id. If the 
opposing party succeeds, the inquiry ends and the taking is invalid. Id. at 587–88. If not, then 
step two asks that the party opposing the taking prove that the primary intent of the plan is to 
benefit private, rather than public, interests. Id. at 588. Again, if the opposing party succeeds, 
the inquiry ends and the taking is invalid. Id. If not, then the test moves on to step three, where 
the burden shifts for the first time to the taking party to show that the proposed economic 
development will in fact benefit the public. Id. Finally, if the taking party succeeds in meeting 
that test, the inquiry moves to step four, in which the burden shifts back to the opposing party, 
who must prove that “the specific condemnation at issue is not reasonably necessary to 
implement the plan.” Id. at 591. The taking only passes constitutional muster if the opposing 
party cannot disprove the reasonable necessity of the condemnation at this stage. Id. 
 110. Id. at 587. 
 111. Id. at 588. The dissent likens the level of proof required to that required in a claim of 
adverse possession in a civil suit. Id. at 589. 
 112. Id. at 593–94. 
 113. Id. at 595–96. 
 114. Among other pieces of evidence, the dissent noted that no development agreement had 
been signed at the time of the taking. Id. at 596. 
 115. Id. at 602. 
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The main point of disagreement between the dissent and the majority 
had to do with “whether the actual use to be implemented will serve 
the public purpose described in the development plan.”116 
B. County of Wayne v. Hathcock 
The Michigan Supreme Court decided Hathcock on July 30, 
2004, between the time that the Connecticut Supreme Court handed 
down its Kelo decision and the time that the Supreme Court heard 
oral arguments in Kelo. In Hathcock, the Michigan Supreme Court 
explicitly overturned its Poletown Neighborhood Council v. Detroit117 
decision from 1981, which had come to stand for what Kelo later came 
to represent—that pure economic development in which private 
property is transferred to other private owners is a valid public use.118 
Detroit is located in Wayne County, Michigan.119 As part of a $2 
billion renovation to the Detroit Metropolitan Airport, the county 
expected problems with noise pollution for neighboring landowners.120 
It used a $21 million grant from the Federal Aviation Administration 
to purchase through voluntary sales the neighboring properties south 
of the airport where it anticipated those issues.121 As a condition of 
receiving the federal grant, Wayne County was obligated to put the 
properties it acquired to “economically productive use.”122 To that 
end, it developed a construction project—called the “Pinnacle 
Project”—that would have resulted in a “large business and 
technology park with a conference center, hotel accommodations, and 
a recreational facility.”123 It was predicted that the Pinnacle Project 
would yield thirty thousand jobs and $350 million in tax revenue for 
 
 116. Id. at 582; see also id. at 584 n.13 (“[T]he question is not whether the development plan 
and the statutes reasonably ensure adherence to the development plan, but, rather, whether 
‘private sector participants’ are available and willing to develop the property and whether the 
terms by which they agree to develop the property will result in a public benefit such that the 
private benefit will be incidental thereto.”). 
 117. Poletown Neighborhood Council v. Detroit, 304 N.W.2d 455 (Mich. 1981), overruled by 
County of Wayne v. Hathcock, 684 N.W.2d 765 (Mich. 2004). 
 118. This Note argues, however, that this rule is an unfortunate misconstruction of what the 
state Kelo holding actually was. See infra Part III. 
 119. Wayne County, Michigan, About WC, http://www.waynecounty.com/about (last visited 
Mar. 7, 2008). 
 120. Hathcock, 684 N.W.2d at 770. 
 121. Id. 
 122. Id. 
 123. Id. 
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the county.124 Wayne County’s voluntary purchase efforts came up 
short of the ambitious plan’s thirteen hundred acres, so it turned to 
eminent domain to acquire the remaining land owned by individual 
property owners.125 Those proceedings ultimately led to the Michigan 
Supreme Court. 
The Michigan Supreme Court only addressed the specific 
situation in which condemned property is transferred to private 
entities.126 It identified three distinct categories of such takings that 
would satisfy the public use clause:127 “(1) where ‘public necessity of 
the extreme sort’ requires collective action; (2) where the property 
remains subject to public oversight after transfer to a private entity; 
and (3) where the property is selected because of ‘facts of 
independent public significance.’”128 
C. Justice O’Connor’s Dissent 
Justice O’Connor wrote the primary dissent in Kelo for the 
Supreme Court.129 Like the Connecticut state court’s Kelo dissent, she 
also advocated limited deference to legislative determinations of what 
 
 124. Id. at 771. 
 125. Id. 
 126. Id. at 781. 
 127. Id. at 783; cf. Kelo v. City of New London, 125 S. Ct. 2655, 2673 (2005) (O’Connor, J., 
dissenting) (identifying “three categories of takings that comply with the public use 
requirement”). 
 128. Hathcock, 684 N.W.2d at 783 (Mich. 2004). As examples, the first category included 
“highways, railroads, canals, and other instrumentalities of commerce.” Id. at 781. The second 
category included a petroleum pipeline over which the state retained some control. Id. at 782 
(citing Lakehead Pipe Line Co. v. Dehn, 64 N.W.2d 903 (Mich. 1954)). And the third category 
included the removal of blight. Id. at 783 (citing In re Slum Clearance, 50 N.W.2d 340 (Mich. 
1951)). 
 129. Kelo, 125 S. Ct. at 2671. Justice Rehnquist, Justice Scalia, and Justice Thomas joined. 
Id. Justice Thomas wrote an additional dissenting opinion arguing that an originalist approach 
to the text was best, and that such an analysis would yield the same conclusions Justice 
O’Connor reached. Id. at 2677 (Thomas, J., dissenting). In particular, he wrote that the holdings 
in Berman and Midkiff were misguided to construe the respective takings in each case as being 
“coterminous” with the police power. Id. at 2685 (quoting Haw. Hous. Auth. v. Midkiff, 467 
U.S. 229, 240 (1984)). Justice Thomas’s unique observation, however, dealt with the practical 
reality of whom such a taking power would likely displace in society. He wrote that the losses of 
personal property “will fall disproportionately on poor communities.” Id. at 2686–87. 
Furthermore, “[U]rban renewal projects have long been associated with the displacement of 
blacks; ‘[i]n cities across the country, urban renewal came to be known as Negro removal.’” Id. 
at 2687 (quoting Wendell E. Pritchett, The “Public Menace” of Blight: Urban Renewal and the 
Private Uses of Eminent Domain, 21 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 1, 47 (2003)) (internal quotation 
marks omitted). 
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benefits the public.130 She outlined three general categories that the 
Court’s precedents have identified as complying with public use. First, 
if the private property taken is transferred to public ownership, the 
taking is permitted.131 Second, if the private property taken is 
transferred to a private owner who makes the property available for 
the public’s use, the taking is permitted.132 Third, when the taking 
itself “meet[s] certain exigencies” and “serve[s] a public purpose,” the 
taking is permitted regardless of the status of the recipient.133 
According to Justice O’Connor, if the NLDC development plan 
were to fit at all in a category, it would be within this third box.134 She 
posed the issue as one of first impression: “Are economic 
development takings constitutional?”135 She emphatically contended 
that they are not.136 Whereas both Berman and Midkiff fit within this 
category because the taking in each “directly achieved a public 
benefit,”137 no such immediate benefit would come from the taking in 
the NLDC project.138 In other words, the “exigencies” that Justice 
O’Connor had in mind were situations in which the “extraordinary, 
precondemnation use of the targeted property inflicted affirmative 
harm on society.”139 Neither her reading of the record nor New 
 
 130. Id. at 2673 (O’Connor, J., dissenting) (“We give considerable deference to legislatures’ 
determinations about what governmental activities will advantage the public. . . . An external, 
judicial check on how the public use requirement is interpreted, however limited, is necessary if 
this constraint on government power is to retain any meaning.”). 
 131. Id. Justice O’Connor listed “a road, a hospital, or a military base” as examples. Id. 
 132. Id. Justice O’Connor listed “a railroad, a public utility, or a stadium” as examples. Id. 
 133. Id. The takings in Berman and Midkiff were cited for this category. Id. 
 134. See id. (“This case returns us . . . to the hard question of when a purportedly ‘public 
purpose’ taking meets the public use requirement.”). 
 135. Id. 
 136. Id. 
 137. Id. at 2674. But see supra note 50. 
 138. Some commentators have noted that language in the dissent suggests that Justice 
O’Connor had become dissatisfied with what Berman and particularly Midkiff, an opinion 
written by Justice O’Connor, had come to stand for in the development of the public use 
doctrine. See, e.g., Steven J. Eagle, Kelo v. City of New London: A Tale of Pragmatism 
Betrayed,” in EMINENT DOMAIN USE AND ABUSE: KELO IN CONTEXT 195, 202 (Dwight H. 
Merriam & Mary Massaron Ross eds., 2006) (“Some of Justice O’Connor’s . . . language 
resembled nothing more than a mea culpa.”). Both opinions liken the eminent domain power to 
the legislature’s police power, thereby suggesting near limitless deference to legislative 
determinations of public use takings. Id. (“If Berman and Midkiff focused on elimination of 
harm, Justice O’Connor saw the Court’s new jurisprudence as unrestrained.”). 
 139. Kelo, 125 S. Ct. at 2674 (O’Connor, J., dissenting). 
04__HAN.DOC 5/27/2008 1:48:31 PM 
2008] EMINENT DOMAIN 1469 
London’s argument suggested to her that Susette Kelo’s property 
caused such harm.140 
D. Common Ground? 
For two of the three opinions that Norwood incorporates into its 
holding, harmonization is relatively straightforward. Hathcock and 
Justice O’Connor’s Kelo dissent significantly overlap in their three-
part structures for defining public use. Both opinions recognize public 
use when the public retains actual physical usage regardless of 
ownership after transfer, and both opinions recognize public use 
when the property is taken under exceptional circumstances. The 
opinions are not identical, however. Although Hathcock is slightly 
more vague in defining exceptional circumstances by only offering 
examples that have met this category’s requirements, Justice 
O’Connor would have specifically required that the act of the taking 
itself have some immediately desirable public use.141 Also, Justice 
O’Connor’s dissent is slightly broader in scope, as one of her 
categories explicitly covers public ownership.142 In contrast, Hathcock 
limits its analysis of public use to scenarios in which condemned 
property is transferred to a private owner, but, like Justice 
O’Connor’s dissent, Hathcock accepts public oversight as a proxy for 
public ownership.143 Despite differences, the essence of Hathcock and 
Justice O’Connor’s dissent are easily compatible. 
Justice Zarella’s dissent is not as concerned with cabining the 
definition of public use as are the O’Connor dissent and the Hathcock 
decision. Instead, the Zarella dissent focuses on the appropriate role 
that courts should play in eminent domain cases by advocating the 
application of heightened scrutiny to condemnations.144 Although 
Justice Zarella sought to limit the deference due to legislative 
 
 140. Id. at 2675. 
 141. Compare id. at 2673 (“[W]e have allowed that . . . takings that serve a public purpose 
also satisfy the Constitution even if the property is destined for subsequent private use.”), with 
County of Wayne v. Hathcock, 684 N.W.2d 765, 783 (Mich. 2004) (noting that the main example 
“turned on the fact that the act of condemnation itself, rather than the use to which the 
condemned land eventually would be put, was a public use”). 
 142. Kelo, 125 S. Ct. at 2673 (O’Connor, J., dissenting).  
 143. See Hathcock, 684 N.W.2d at 782 (“[T]he transfer of condemned property to a private 
entity is consistent with the constitution’s ‘public use’ requirement when the private entity 
remains accountable to the public in its use of that property.”). 
 144. Kelo v. City of New London, 843 A.2d 500, 587–92 (Conn. 2004) (Zarella, J., 
dissenting), aff’d, 125 S. Ct. 2655 (2005). 
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determinations of public use, he specifically advocated that courts not 
defer to municipal determinations of “whether the actual use to be 
implemented will serve a public purpose.”145 He was less focused on 
defining public use, leaving that duty up to the state legislature.146 If 
adopted, Justice Zarella’s dissent would have ultimately increased 
judicial oversight of the actual development projects themselves when 
eminent domain was involved. 
But from a slightly broader viewpoint, Hathcock, Justice 
O’Connor, and Justice Zarella were all fundamentally concerned with 
the inherently speculative nature of economic development plans. In 
other words, all three opinions were concerned with ensuring that the 
public would actually benefit from a taking. They only differed on 
what guiding principle courts could, or should, use toward that end. 
Justice O’Connor’s dissent would limit uses of eminent domain to 
situations in which the taking itself provided an objective public 
benefit, until a better limiting principle could be articulated.147 The 
other opinions did articulate more or less coherent limiting principles, 
although Justice O’Connor referred to neither of them: Hathcock 
required “facts of independent public significance,”148 and Justice 
Zarella would require “clear and convincing evidence.”149 
Because the Ohio Supreme Court itself did not synthesize the 
three opinions it invoked, it frustratingly failed to suggest a limiting 
principle that is any clearer than the others already offered. Norwood 
did hold that “[a]lthough economic benefit can be considered as a 
factor among others in determining whether there is a sufficient 
public use and benefit in a taking, it cannot serve as the sole basis for 
finding such benefit.”150 But that adds nothing new to eminent domain 
jurisprudence. 
 
 145. Id. at 583. 
 146. Id. at 582. 
 147. To Justice O’Connor, the Supreme Court majority was satisfied with the fact that “[t]he 
NLDC’s plan is the product of a relatively careful deliberative process”; meanwhile, Justice 
O’Connor was concerned with finding a limiting principle that could ferret out “property 
transfers generated with less care, that are less comprehensive, that happen to result from less 
elaborate process, whose only projected advantage is the incidence of higher taxes, or that hope 
to transform an already prosperous city into an even more prosperous one.” Kelo, 125 S. Ct. at 
2676–77 (O’Connor, J., dissenting). 
 148. Hathcock, 684 N.W.2d at 783. 
 149. Kelo, 843 A.2d at 588. 
 150. City of Norwood v. Horney, 853 N.E.2d 1115, 1141 (Ohio 2006). 
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Even more maddening is the fact that the Ohio Supreme Court 
employed an entirely separate legal doctrine to resolve Norwood’s 
dispute; it invoked the void-for-vagueness doctrine to strike down the 
Norwood city code that defined a “deteriorating” area.151 It found the 
definition too speculative and therefore an unconstitutionally 
impermissible basis for eminent domain.152 In a sense, then, Norwood 
also impeded the state legislature’s own attempt at working out a 
limiting principle: part of what the Ohio state legislature had already 
employed as a limiting principle was constitutionally invalid—for 
being too vague and not necessarily because there would be 
insufficient public use for the city development project.153 At best, 
therefore, Norwood’s holding can be read as requiring some 
guarantee that an economic development project will benefit the 
public. How that principle could be articulated—and whether it is 
ultimately for the judiciary or the legislature to do so—went unsaid. 
III.  A LANGUAGE-BASED LIMITING PRINCIPLE 
The Norwood holding demonstrates the difficulty in finding a 
limiting principle to determine what types of economic development 
constitute “public use.” This Part proposes that much of the problem 
with drawing a line to protect individual property owners has to do 
with extreme shifts in the language of eminent domain law since its 
inception in the U.S. Constitution. Although the battle over language 
in law is not unique to any one field and may not always rise above a 
mere semantic debate, it is particularly acute in the realm of eminent 
domain. This Part traces the various ways that issues in eminent 
domain jurisprudence have been characterized and shows how courts 
and parties have gone beyond merely interpreting words to actually 
changing the words themselves. Such linguistic transmutation helps 
explain why opinions like Norwood struggle to provide useful 
guidance in the face of controversial takings. 
 
 151. See supra notes 73–75 and accompanying text (distinguishing the Norwood Code’s 
definition of a “deteriorating” area and a “deteriorated” area). 
 152. Norwood, 853 N.E.2d at 1146. 
 153. See id. (“We therefore hold that the use of ‘deteriorating area’ as a standard . . . is void 
for vagueness . . . . Further, we hold that the term ‘deteriorating area’ cannot be used as a 
standard for a taking, because it inherently incorporates speculation as to the future condition 
of the property . . . .”). 
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A. “Public Use” v. “Public Purpose” 
The first major issue of interpretation in eminent domain law has 
to do with the source of authority itself: the Fifth Amendment of the 
U.S. Constitution. Since Midkiff and Berman, it has been generally 
accepted that the “public use” clause in the Fifth Amendment is not 
limited to literal use by the public.154 Instead, the definition of “public 
use” has expanded to mean more broadly “public purpose.”155 The 
Supreme Court in Kelo highlighted this interpretation, and the dissent 
acknowledged that this is accepted precedent.156 The Court had “long 
ago rejected any literal requirement that condemned property be put 
into use for the general public.”157 The Court therefore described the 
case as “turn[ing] on the question [of] whether [New London]’s 
development plan serves a ‘public purpose.’”158 
Similarly, the Connecticut Supreme Court effected the same 
language transmutation. The court started by reaching as far back as 
1866 to its own case of Olmstead v. Camp159 and noted that it had 
“long . . . taken a flexible approach” to construing the public use 
clause of its state constitution.160 It “rejected a strict construction that 
‘the term “public use” mean[t] possession, occupation, [or] direct 
enjoyment, by the public’”161 in favor of a broader “purposive 
formulation.”162 Unlike the U.S. Supreme Court, the Connecticut 
Supreme Court did not explicitly define public use in terms of public 
purpose, but it came close when it described its other past cases: 
“[T]he court in Barnes expressly used the terms ‘public use’ and 
‘public purpose’ in an interchangeable manner, a definition we later 
adopted in Katz v. Brandon, a redevelopment taking case.”163 
Highlighting the language in Katz, the Connecticut Supreme Court in 
Kelo fully endorsed the fungibility of the two phrases: “[P]ublic use 
 
 154. Kelo v. City of New London, 125 S. Ct. 2655, 2662 (2005). 
 155. Id. 
 156. Id. at 2673 (O’Connor, J., dissenting). 
 157. Id. at 2662 (majority opinion) (quoting Haw. Hous. Auth. v. Midkiff, 467 U.S. 229, 244 
(1984)). 
 158. Id. at 2663. 
 159. Olmstead v. Camp, 33 Conn. 532 (1866). 
 160. Kelo v. City of New London, 843 A.2d 500, 522 (Conn. 2004), aff’d, 125 S. Ct. 2655 
(2005). 
 161. Id. 
 162. Id. at 523. 
 163. Kelo, 843 A.2d at 523 n.32 (citation omitted) (citing Katz v. Brandon, 245 A.2d 579, 586 
(Conn. 1968); Barnes v. City of New Haven, 98 A.2d 523 (Conn. 1953)). 
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defies absolute definition . . . . Courts as a rule, instead of attempting 
judicially to define a public as distinguished from a private purpose, 
have left each case to be determined on its own peculiar 
circumstances.”164 
B. “Urban Revitalization” v. “Economic Development” 
Against the backdrop of fluid and expansive interpretation of the 
origin of eminent domain law, the language debate most pertinent to 
post-Kelo law is whether situations like New London’s and 
Norwood’s are best described as “urban revitalization” or “economic 
development.” This Note argues that “urban revitalization” is a public 
use whereas “economic development” is not necessarily so.165 The 
debate is one that the Kelo briefs presented front and center, even if 
they did not explicitly designate it as a point of contention.166 One 
might argue that the distinction is merely semantic and that 
characterizing the issue favorably is a matter of brief writing. 
Nevertheless, the choice of terminology does identify distinguishing 
features of a case like Kelo versus a case that truly warrants the fear 
of unrestricted eminent domain that Justice O’Connor expressed.167 
The Michigan Supreme Court’s decision in Hathcock expresses how, 
when viewed as pursuing economic benefit, takings can appear 
limitless in scope: 
Every business, every productive unit in society . . . contribute[s] in 
some way to the commonwealth. To justify the exercise of eminent 
 
 164. Id. at 524–25 (quoting Katz, 245 A.2d at 586) (emphasis omitted). This point is 
particularly relevant because it suggests that deference to the legislature regarding the public 
use doctrine is not a blind surrender to legislative determinations, as the United States Kelo 
opinion often is viewed. 
 165. “Urban revitalization” may be more applicable to New London’s situation, and 
“economic development” may be more applicable to Norwood’s case. 
 166. Compare Brief of Respondent at 1, Kelo v. City of New London, 125 S. Ct. 2655 (2005) 
(No. 04-108) (“QUESTION PRESENTED: Does the Takings Clause of the Fifth Amendment 
forbid an economically distressed city from employing its eminent domain power to condemn, 
and pay just compensation for, private property in order to reverse decades of economic 
decline, create thousands of jobs and significantly increase property taxes and other sources of 
revenue for the city, and to realize immediate structural and environmental benefits for the city 
and its residents?”), with Brief of Petitioners at 1, Kelo v. City of New London, 125 S. Ct. 2655 
(2005) (No. 04-108) (“QUESTION PRESENTED: What protection does the Fifth 
Amendment’s public use requirement provide for individuals whose property is being 
condemned, not to eliminate slums or blight, but for the sole purpose of ‘economic 
development’ that will perhaps increase tax revenues and improve the local economy?”). 
 167. See Kelo, 125 S. Ct. at 2677 (O’Connor, J., dissenting) (“Any property may now be 
taken for the benefit of another private party . . . .”). 
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domain solely on the basis of the fact that the use of that property by 
a private entity seeking its own profit might contribute to the 
economy’s health is to render impotent our constitutional limitations 
on the government’s power of eminent domain. Poletown’s 
“economic benefit” rationale would validate practically any exercise 
of the power of eminent domain on behalf of a private entity.168 
Indeed, the state court Kelo dissent consistently chose to refer to the 
public use in question as “economic development.”169 
In contrast, the state court Kelo majority referred to the public 
use in question as “urban revitalization.”170 The semantic difference is 
not insignificant. “Development” suggests growth or progression.171 
“Revitalization,” on the other hand, suggests imparting new life or 
vigor to something.172 The latter connotes that a loss of some sort must 
first occur before revitalization can take place whereas the former 
could occur in almost any situation. This distinction was potentially so 
important that the Connecticut court chose to repeat the question 
presented in Kelo in full detail no fewer than four times. For example, 
the Connecticut Supreme Court first characterized the issue as 
follows: 
The principal issue in this appeal is whether the public use clauses of 
the federal and state constitutions authorize the exercise of the 
eminent domain power in furtherance of a significant economic 
development plan that is projected to create in excess of 1000 jobs, 
to increase tax and other revenues, and to revitalize an economically 
distressed city, including its downtown and waterfront areas.173 
Each time it reiterated the issue at stake, it used similarly detailed 
language and pointedly asserted that New London’s project was not 
 
 168. County of Wayne v. Hathcock, 684 N.W.2d 765, 786 (Mich. 2004). 
 169. See, e.g., Kelo, 843 A.2d at 587 (Zarella, J., dissenting) (“[S]o, too, should a heightened 
standard of judicial review be required to ensure that the constitutional rights of private 
property owners are protected adequately when property is taken for private economic 
development . . . .”). 
 170. See, e.g., id. at 520 (majority opinion) (“We conclude that economic development 
projects . . . contributing to urban revitalization, satisfy the public use clauses of the state and 
federal constitutions.”). 
 171. WEBSTER’S ENCYCLOPEDIC UNABRIDGED DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE 
543 (1996). 
 172. Id. at 1648. 
 173. Kelo, 843 A.2d at 507. 
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just about making more money.174 In fact, it was the Connecticut 
Supreme Court—more than any other court—that recognized the full 
complexity of the situation and the competing interests of the city and 
the residents at stake in the taking. Unfortunately, at some point in 
the aftermath of the Kelo decision, the actual status and struggles of 
the city of New London took a backseat to the simpler and less 
descriptive public image of “economic development.”175 Despite 
affirming the Connecticut Supreme Court, Justice Stevens’s choice of 
simpler terminology in the Supreme Court opinion was to some 
extent his greatest disservice to advocates who support using eminent 
domain for economic development purposes—not his permissive 
baseline statement—because he eschewed using either “urban 
revitalization” or “economic development” to frame the debate, and 
thereby did not choose a side in this particular debate at all.176 
 
 174. The second time the issue was stated was at the conclusion of the Connecticut Supreme 
Court’s analysis of eminent domain legal precedent: 
[W]e conclude that economic development plans that the appropriate legislative 
authority rationally has determined will promote municipal economic development 
by creating new jobs, increasing tax and other revenues, and otherwise revitalizing 
distressed urban areas, constitute a valid public use for the exercise of the eminent 
domain power under either the state or federal constitution. 
Id. at 531. The third time, the court was applying the law to the facts of one of the parcels owned 
by the petitioners: 
[W]e concluded that economic development projects created and implemented 
pursuant to chapter 132 of the General Statutes that have the public economic 
benefits of creating new jobs, increasing tax and other revenues, and contributing to 
urban revitalization, namely, the development plan in the present case, satisfy the 
public use clauses of the federal and state constitutions. 
Id. at 555–56. The fourth and final description of the issue occurred when the court was again 
applying the law to the facts of the case: 
In part II of this opinion, we concluded that economic development projects created 
and implemented pursuant to chapter 132 of the General Statutes that have the 
public economic benefits of creating new jobs, increasing tax and other revenues, and 
contributing to urban revitalization, namely, the development plan in the present 
case, satisfy the public use clauses of the federal and state constitutions. 
Id. at 569. 
 175. One commentator argues that the City of New London has itself to blame for this. 
Although New London’s statutorily defined status as a “distressed municipality” prompted the 
development plan, in its brief to the Supreme Court, the city chose to focus on the benefits of 
economic development isolated from the initial disposition of the city. See Ackerman, supra 
note 52, at 306 (“Rather than focus on the established, legitimate exercise of the police power 
for blight removal, the Respondent sought a confirmation that economic development alone 
was also a legitimate exercise of the police power as long as the legislature had declared it to be 
so.”). 
 176. Compare Kelo v. City of New London, 125 S. Ct. 2655, 2658 (2005) (“The question 
presented is whether the city’s proposed disposition of this property qualifies as a ‘public use’ 
within the meaning of the Takings Clause of the Fifth Amendment to the Constitution.”), with 
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C. “Blight” v. “Distressed Area” 
Before New London ever thought to condemn Susette Kelo’s 
property, the State of Connecticut had designated the city a 
“distressed municipality.”177 The state legislature defines that label 
according to certain measurable economic parameters.178 Blight, 
similarly, is statutorily defined in all fifty states,179 although it is often 
mistaken for a merely descriptive term. Blight statutes purport to 
offer objective standards to measure economic decay within a 
community. A municipality suffering from blight necessarily fits 
within the exigencies of the third category of public use that Hathcock 
and Justice O’Connor described. By analogy, it seems reasonable that 
a “distressed municipality” could likewise fit within that category. 
Given that Hathcock and Justice O’Connor agreed that a taking is 
permissible when it eliminates blight, it appears that they should 
likewise agree that a taking is permissible when it eliminates the 
source of distress in a “distressed municipality.” 
And yet, New London’s use of eminent domain was never 
justified as a Berman-type taking, in which the taking itself was 
necessary to combat blight, despite another similarity between 
Berman and New London’s situation. In Kelo, both the U.S. Supreme 
Court’s and the Connecticut Supreme Court’s assessments of the facts 
viewed the city’s development plan as addressing employment and 
tax revenue problems in the area as a whole, rather than a specific 
distressed area.180 Berman, too, at least in Justice Stevens’s view, 
required that city development efforts be viewed as a whole instead 
of piecemeal.181 Because Berman permitted taking a nonblighted 
property due to its location within a larger area that was as a whole 
 
Kelo, 843 A.2d at 520 (“We conclude that economic development projects created and 
implemented pursuant to chapter 132 that have the public economic benefits of creating new 
jobs, increasing tax and other revenues, and contributing to urban revitalization, satisfy the 
public use clauses of the state and federal constitutions.”). 
 177. See supra note 21 and accompanying text. 
 178. Id. 
 179. Hudson Hayes Luce, The Meaning of Blight: A Survey of Statutory and Case Law, 35 
REAL PROP. PROB. & TR. J. 389, 394 (2000). 
 180. Compare Kelo, 125 S. Ct. at 2658 (“[I]t is appropriate for us . . . to resolve the 
challenges of the individual owners, not on a piecemeal basis, but rather in light of the entire 
plan.”), with Kelo 843 A.2d at 537 n.50 (“[A]n appropriate public use analysis necessarily 
requires evaluation of the development plan as a whole—the end result of the sum of all of its 
parts.”). 
 181. See Kelo, 125 S. Ct. at 2665 n.13 (“It was important to redesign the whole area . . . . The 
entire area needed redesigning . . . .” (quoting Berman v. Parker, 75 S. Ct. 98, 103 (1954))). 
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blighted, New London could have made an analogous argument with 
respect to Kelo’s property being in an area that was as a whole 
“distressed.” It did not. Instead, the difference, whatever it may be, 
between a “blighted area” and a “distressed municipality”—though 
both are objectively and statutorily defined by the Connecticut state 
legislature—was enough to center the issue in Kelo on the disposition 
of the petitioners’ property after the taking rather than on whether 
the taking itself would remedy the municipal distress. 
The logical fallacy in the distinction between “blight” and 
“distressed area,” or any other statutory definition of land condition, 
is that it is one of degree rather than clear-cut categorization. Court 
opinions like Justice O’Connor’s dissent advocate the use of a limiting 
principle like a blight standard because they are concerned with the 
degree of speculation inherent in city planning.182 “Blight,” however, 
is neither as objectively discernible as the Court assumes, nor is it any 
more immune from the manipulation of the legislature than is a 
problematic phrase like “distressed area.”183 
D. From Kelo to Norwood 
The only plain holding in Norwood was that a taking cannot be 
primarily for “economic benefit,” regardless if other motivations are 
present or not.184 This holding shows how dramatically the debate 
changed in the year between Kelo and Norwood. The Ohio Supreme 
Court interpreted Kelo to stand for a proposition that it was never 
meant to: that takings that bestow some economic benefit are 
constitutionally valid.185 After just one year and with the quagmire of 
eminent domain language that the U.S. Supreme Court has done little 
to resolve, Kelo revealed itself as a Pyrrhic victory for urban 
 
 182. See, e.g., id. at 2676 (O’Connor, J., dissenting) (“[T]he judiciary cannot get bogged 
down in predictive judgments about whether the public will actually be better off after a 
property transfer.”). 
 183. For a proposal on a model definition of blight that is more immune to the potential 
manipulation of legislatures, see generally Will Lovell, Note, The Kelo Blowback: How the 
Newly-Enacted Eminent Domain Statutes and Past Blight Statutes Are a Maginot Line-Defense 
Mechanism for All Non-Affluent and Minority Property Owners, 68 OHIO ST. L.J. 609 (2007). 
 184. See City of Norwood v. Horney, 853 N.E.2d 1115, 1123 (Ohio 2006) (“We hold that 
although economic factors may be considered in determining whether private property may be 
appropriated, the fact that the appropriation would provide an economic benefit to the 
government and community, standing alone, does not satisfy the public-use requirement of 
Section 19, Article I of the Ohio Constitution.”). 
 185. Cf. id. at 1142 (holding that “an economic or financial benefit alone” is not a public 
use). 
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redevelopment advocates. The speed with which the debate shifted 
necessarily begs the question whether Norwood is an appropriate 
model for other state courts addressing similar problems. 
IV.  A BETTER STATE COURT MODEL 
Although it does not appear that the Connecticut Supreme Court 
majority consciously intended to do so, it has offered the strongest 
framework for assessing takings in an economic development context. 
That opinion is as much in favor of property rights advocates as any 
other. It is crucial that in searching for a model opinion for the future, 
both sides of the debate look to the methodology and not the result of 
a case. Although Norwood was ostensibly a victory for individual 
property owners, the state Kelo decision may hold better protections 
of their rights because of the guidance it offers state courts. This Part 
extracts the key factors from the Connecticut Supreme Court’s 
opinion and proposes that these be used as a starting point on which 
eminent domain jurisprudence in the context of economic 
development is refined. 
A. Prerequisites 
The Connecticut court presumed at least two conditions must be 
satisfied for constitutionally permissible takings. First, there must be 
some statutorily defined thresholds that municipalities must meet. 
The most common type of statute—and one that has been 
unequivocally endorsed as applicable by the U.S. Supreme Court186—
is a blight statute. In Kelo, the applicable statute defined a “distressed 
municipality.”187 And although it was struck down on other grounds, 
in Norwood the applicable statute defined a “deteriorating area.”188 
No matter what actual term is used, the key is for a legislative body to 
independently describe the municipal conditions that it deems 
unacceptable before it gets involved with an economic development 
plan. By doing so, a legislature ensures that a proposed condemnation 
occurs in an “urban revitalization” context and not just in an 
“economic development” context. 
 
 186. See Kelo, 125 S. Ct. at 2673 (O’Connor, J., dissenting) (accepting takings to eliminate 
blight as a constitutional example of “public use”). 
 187. See supra note 21 and accompanying text. 
 188. See supra note 73–75 and accompanying text. 
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Second, the initiative for the development plan must originate 
with the state or municipality. It should not originate with a private 
developer. This distinction has not been emphasized despite the fact 
that almost all courts have expressed a desire to ensure that the 
primary beneficiary not be a private party.189 Based on just this simple 
consideration, at least as far as the Ohio Supreme Court portrayed 
the situation,190 Norwood would have failed meeting this prerequisite. 
In contrast, in Kelo, the City of New London initiated the project, 
trying to take advantage of a state bond to turn itself around.191 
B. The Development Plan 
The linchpin to the usefulness of the Connecticut Supreme Court 
model is the development plan.192 What makes the development plan 
so important in this context is the guidance it gives in establishing the 
boundary between the legislature and the judiciary so that each 
branch’s expertise is best used. The development plan is in essence a 
contract193 that is created by the legislative body and enforced by the 
courts. 
First, the process by which a development plan is created has 
objectively ascertainable factors that a court can look at on a case-by-
case basis. Given the variety of issues that municipalities across the 
country face, there is no checklist of requirements for a development 
plan. For example, in Kelo, the development plan went through at 
least six permutations before it was finally accepted.194 
 
 189. The Connecticut Supreme Court, for example, recognized this concern. Kelo v. City of 
New London, 843 A.2d 500, 543, aff’d, 125 S. Ct. 2655 (2005) (“[A]n exercise of the eminent 
domain power is unreasonable . . . if the facts and circumstances of the particular case reveal 
that the taking specifically is intended to benefit a private party.”). 
 190. See Norwood, 853 N.E.2d at 1124 (“A private, limited-liability company, Rookwood 
Partners, Ltd. . . . entered discussions with Norwood about redeveloping the appellants’ 
neighborhood.”); see also Sparks, supra note 95, at 1779 (“In 2002, a development group 
approached the City Council of Norwood, Ohio with a redevelopment project proposal, and 
asked the council to exercise its power of eminent domain to aid in the project.”). 
 191. See supra notes 24–26 and accompanying text. 
 192. See Kelo, 843 A.2d at 536 (distinguishing the case at hand from problematic takings for 
economic development on the basis of the “carefully considered development plan” at issue). 
 193. See, e.g., id. at 544 (analogizing the standard of review of the development plan to that 
which would be applied to “contractual” restraints). 
 194. See supra note 29 and accompanying text. 
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Second, when viewed as a contract, a development plan can 
assure a level of state control over the economic development.195 Both 
Justice O’Connor in her Kelo dissent and the Hathcock majority 
expressed a willingness to allow condemnation transfers to private 
properties so long as the public maintained some oversight.196 As the 
Connecticut Supreme Court explained, New London’s development 
plan could not be changed without legislative approval because of 
various statutory requirements.197 Furthermore, New London wrote in 
various covenants to ensure that future parties to the development 
plan would have to adhere to these requirements.198 These covenants 
not only addressed the issue of control, but they also spoke to the 
question of time with which Justice O’Connor was concerned.199 By 
specifying when certain benchmarks had to be met during project 
construction, the development plan blunted the speculative nature of 
the proposed city project.200 In these situations, a court’s role is more 
tenable: it can bring the tools of contract law to bear on economic 
development to ensure that a “public use” is in fact satisfied.201 
Third, the Connecticut Supreme Court managed to find a 
balance between deference to the legislature, which Norwood 
hesitated to accept,202 and heightened scrutiny, which Justice Zarella’s 
dissent strongly advocated. The Connecticut court accepted the 
practical reality that economic development plans require assessment 
as a whole.203 Indeed, the U.S. Supreme Court recognized this need 
too in Berman, in which Justice O’Connor wrote for the majority and 
understood that one nonblighted property should not stand in the 
way of revitalizing a larger surrounding area which was otherwise 
blighted.204 At the same time, the Connecticut Supreme Court still 
engaged in a piecemeal analysis of the condemned plots by 
 
 195. See Kelo, 843 A.2d at 545 (“We . . . conclude that the trial court properly determined 
that the significant state involvement in this project . . . functions to provide a level of 
governmental oversight beyond that provided by the development corporation.”). 
 196. See supra text accompanying notes 127–128, 143. 
 197. Kelo, 843 A.2d at 544 n.63. 
 198. Id. at 545 n.64. 
 199. See supra text accompanying note 138. 
 200. Kelo, 843 A.2d at 545 (“[T]here are sufficient assurances that the public use of the 
development plan will be carried out.”). 
 201. See id. at 536 (“[R]esponsible judicial oversight over the ultimate public use question 
does much to quell the opportunity for abuse of the eminent domain power.”). 
 202. See supra notes 88–89 and accompanying text. 
 203. See supra note 180 and accompanying text. 
 204. See supra note 181 and accompanying text. 
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questioning the reasonable necessity of each parcel to the plan as a 
whole.205 The court made clear that it was not engaging in heightened 
scrutiny,206 and by only requiring reasonableness, it largely deferred to 
the city’s determinations. The court, however, still made a point of 
looking at the specific condemnations.207 
Despite New London’s considered development plan and the 
state court’s deliberative review, Justice O’Connor nonetheless 
expressed anxiety that development plans are not a magic bright line 
to protect individual property owners.208 In this respect, Justice 
O’Connor is correct. But, as this Note has shown, no bright-line test 
exists in eminent domain law.209 If urban revitalization is to be a real 
option for cities to combat economic decline, requiring a bright-line 
rule is impractical. What is practical is establishing how the respective 
expertise of the legislative and judicial branches of government can 
be best used to revitalize urban areas, while still affording individual 
property owners their constitutionally protected rights. 
CONCLUSION 
At first glance, the purpose behind New London’s and 
Norwood’s attempts to take away the property of their residents 
appears to be little more than economic benefit. But delving deeper, 
both cities were suffering from statutorily defined plights. Their 
attempts to remedy economic downturns through urban 
redevelopment were not based on whimsical decisions but rather on 
deliberative planning.210 The two state supreme courts in these cases 
were on opposite sides of the U.S. Supreme Court decision that 
would galvanize property rights advocates and flood the media. Those 
courts and others have not been blind to the fact that this situation 
requires the heavy involvement of legislative bodies, and they have 
 
 205. See Kelo, 843 A.2d at 558–62 (analyzing the market for a class A office building). 
 206. Id. at 528 n.39; see also Kelo v. City of New London, 125 S. Ct. 2655, 2667–68 (2005) 
(“The disadvantages of a heightened form of review are especially pronounced in this type of 
case.”). 
 207. Interestingly, it is unclear what precedent the court was relying on to engage in this 
parcel-specific analysis. 
 208. See supra note 147. 
 209. See supra Part III. 
 210. New London culled through no fewer than six city development plans to create its final 
plan. See supra note 29. 
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struggled with the issue of how much deference to give when an 
individual right as precious as property is involved.211 
The Ohio Supreme Court’s Norwood opinion has been suggested 
by some commentators as a model for states to use to protect 
individual property rights against eminent domain abuse, mostly 
because of its result and its first-in-time position post-Kelo.212 The 
Ohio Supreme Court, however, paradoxically rejected the very 
authority—Justice Stevens’s opinion—that permitted it to further 
safeguard the rights of property owners from unchecked city and state 
legislatures. Its Norwood decision was more of a rallying cry than a 
template in that it lacked clear reasoning for rebuking the U.S. 
Supreme Court. Instead, this Note proposes that the Connecticut 
Supreme Court’s original opinion in Kelo is the better model for state 
courts to use. Justice Stevens could have been contemplating that 
opinion when he wrote that “state constitutional law” and “state 
eminent domain statutes” may provide better protection to 
individuals. Although the state Kelo decision sided with New London, 
it offered olive branches to both sides of the eminent domain debate. 
From an even broader perspective, this Note encourages state 
courts in the post-Kelo world to resist any oversimplification of the 
issues. The city official facing the decision whether to condemn fellow 
citizens’ homes has too much at stake to take that choice lightly and 
succumb to such simplified political sound bites. The official is 
accountable to voters.213 The official also knows that the economic 
 
 211. Several courts have explicitly held that property ownership is a fundamental right, e.g., 
City of Norwood v. Horney, 853 N.E.2d 1115, 1129 (Ohio 2006), which typically demands 
heightened scrutiny review, Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 719–20 (1997). In property 
law, however, this conclusion does not necessarily follow. See ConocoPhillips Co. v. Henry, 520 
F. Supp. 2d 1282, 1318–19 (N.D. Okla. 2007) (explaining that the U.S. Supreme Court does not 
protect all aspects of property rights, though fundamental, under substantive due process). 
 212. See, e.g., Lee, supra note 11, at 139–40 (referring to Norwood and noting “the judiciary 
may yet be the branch that restores new life to the principle that constitutional limits do exist 
with respect to eminent domain”); Elisabeth Sperow, The Kelo Legacy: Political Accountability, 
Not Legislation, Is the Cure, 38 MCGEORGE L. REV. 405, 424–25 (2007) (“Norwood exemplifies 
that additional legislation is not needed for state court judges to adopt and follow their own 
standards of review.”); see also Sparks, supra note 95, at 1793–94 (warning future state supreme 
courts away from adopting Norwood’s void-for-vagueness rationale). 
 213. See, e.g., Sperow, supra note 212, at 426–27 (advocating that political accountability is a 
superior check on eminent domain abuse than are state courts); see also Recent Case, City of 
Norwood v. Horney, 853 N.E.2d 1115 (Ohio 2006), 120 HARV. L. REV. 643, 648–49 (2006) 
(challenging the Ohio Supreme Court’s assumption in Norwood that contractors will inevitably 
exert more influence on the political process than would the collective voice of individual 
property owners). 
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development may not have the desired results.214 And as a 
homeowner, that official understands the intangible value of 
property. Still, sometimes, a city official has actually done the 
necessary homework, and that official’s vote in favor of a taking for 
economic development is both necessary and constitutionally sound. 
 
 214. Some have argued that Justice O’Connor’s concerns over economic development 
project benefits actually adhering to the public have already been realized because many urban 
renewal projects have failed. See, e.g., Lovell, supra note 183, at 627–28 (“Not only is [urban 
renewal] generally thought to be ineffective, it is also considered to cause more harm than 
good.”). 
